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Abstract 
Non-adaptive, stochastic evolutionary causes, such as genetic drift, comprise an 
important element of biologists’ explanatory models of evolutionary change, and yet science 
education research has focused almost exclusively on student ideas and misconceptions about 
natural selection. After instruction that includes stochastic causal factors (such as genetic drift), 
how do students construct evolutionary explanations? We used clinical interviews, open-
response and multiple-choice instruments to investigate undergraduate students’ non-adaptive 
reasoning (NAR) patterns. After instruction, we found NAR to be very uncommon in students’ 
explanatory models of evolutionary change in both written assessments and clinical interviews. 
However, when NAR was used by students, it was conceptualized in an expert-like way; that is, 
non-adaptive and stochastic factors were modeled as alternatives to selection. Interestingly, non-
adaptive reasoning was not found to be associated with greater understanding of natural selection 
in interviews or written assessments, or with fewer misconceptions of natural selection. Thus, 
NAR appears to be a distinct facet of evolutionary thinking. Greater attention to NAR in biology 
education is needed given how uncommonly students use it to explain evolutionary change. 
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  Introduction 
A central goal of science education reform is to refocus teaching, learning, and 
assessment on core concepts or ‘big ideas’ (e.g., NRC, 2001a, 2001b; AAAS, 2011). One such 
big idea in the life sciences is biological evolution. Although evolution comprises the framework 
upon which the life sciences are structured (Dobzhansky, 1973), student learning of the idea and 
its associated causal concepts remains extremely problematic for students at all levels of the 
educational hierarchy (Bishop and Anderson, 1990; Nehm and Reilly, 2007; Gregory, 2009). In 
an effort to understand how to improve student learning about evolution, a major thrust of 
science education research has been to focus on students’ alternative conceptions about evolution 
and develop pedagogies to initiate conceptual change (e.g., Demastes, Settlage and Good, 1995). 
Considerably less research has focused on how students reason about alternative scientific 
models seeking to explain the same phenomenon (e.g., of the possible causes, which most 
powerfully account for evolutionary change?). Indeed, within the field of science education, 
research has focused overwhelmingly on adaptive and selective thinking patterns. Research has 
yet to explore how non-adaptive factors are situated within students’ conceptual ecologies of 
evolutionary causation. 
While intense debate about the causal factors accounting for the structure of the natural 
world persists in many science domains, and reflects deeply complex philosophical and 
epistemological tensions (e.g., Conway Morris, 2003; Randall, 2011), we wish to engage with 
this topic at a level that intersects with important questions about the teaching of evolution. 
Within the field of evolutionary biology, deterministic and stochastic frameworks have been 
used to account for and explain (conceptually and methodologically) the processes that undergird 
evolutionary patterns in the living world, both past and present (Gould, 2002). While the body of 
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work in this area is immense, we wish to focus attention on two concepts that represent core 
perspectives on evolutionary causation and have direct relevance to K-16 science educators: 
natural selection and genetic drift (Table 1).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Natural selection is considered by evolutionary biologists to be the primary mechanism 
causing adaptive evolutionary change (Pigliucci and Müller, 2010). Adaptive evolutionary 
change occurs when the frequency of a trait (genetic or phenotypic feature) increases because it 
confers a survival or reproductive advantage to the ‘individuals’ (genes, bacteria, animals, etc.) 
possessing it (Dawkins, 1976; Darwin, 1859). Importantly, as noted above, natural selection is 
not the only cause of evolutionary changes in the living world. Alternative mechanisms, 
collectively known as ‘non-adaptive’ factors, include concepts such as genetic drift and 
developmental constraints, among others (Gould and Lewontin, 1979; Nickels, Nelson and 
Beard, 1996; Gould, 2002). Non-adaptive change (e.g., genetic drift) occurs when the frequency 
of a trait increases or decreases because of stochastic factors, regardless of whether the trait 
confers an advantage, disadvantage, or is neutral with respect to survival or reproduction 
(Freeman, 2005).  
As noted by Orr (1998, p. 2099), evolutionary biologists have long been seeking ways to 
determine whether a phenotypic or genetic difference (e.g., short vs. long spines; dark vs. light 
coloration; presence or absence of an allele) was caused by natural selection, genetic drift, or 
combinations of the two factors. Biologists often conceptualize selection and drift as alternative 
or competing evolutionary explanations; selection is deterministic, and drift is stochastic (Sober 
1984, p. 110). Methodologically, several approaches have been developed by evolutionary 
biologists to empirically test the causal contributions of these two processes (for details, see Orr, 
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1998). While many studies have modeled evolutionary change as being caused by either 
selection or drift, research has also looked at the collective contributions of both mechanisms to 
evolutionary change (i.e., selection and drift; Ackermann and Cheverud, 2004).  
Mirroring broader scientific debates about the role of deterministic and stochastic 
processes in the natural world, the relative importance of selection and drift has been 
controversial within evolutionary biology for some time. Evolution by natural selection was 
introduced through the work of Darwin (1859) and Wallace (1871) and gained ground after the 
“eclipse of Darwinism” in the early twentieth century (Bowler, 1983). At this time, publications 
raised the question of the relative contributions of selection and random survival (e.g., 
Hagedoorn and Hagedoorn, 1921; Fisher, 1922). Fisher, for example, viewed deterministic 
processes as paramount and natural selection as the only important cause of evolutionary change 
(Provine, 1971). Genetic drift was introduced primarily through Wright’s studies of population 
genetics in the early 1930s, but a lack of convincing experimental evidence led some 
evolutionary biologists, including Fisher, to reject drift as an important cause of evolutionary 
change (Savage, 1969; Provine, 1971).  
These earlier debates were revived with Kimura’s (1968) finding of a high rate of neutral 
mutation; such empirical findings provided support for stochastic causal contributors (e.g., 
genetic drift) to evolutionary change. Nevertheless, many evolutionary biologists remained 
strong subscribers of what some have termed an ‘adaptationist approach’ to evolution. For 
instance, Mayr argued that it is in fact the goal of the evolutionary biologist to first try ‘to 
explain biological phenomena and processes as the product of natural selection’ (1983, p. 326). 
Gould and Lewontin (1979) countered that Mayr’s view is typical of what they caricatured as the 
‘Panglossian paradigm.’ Gould and Lewontin refer to Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss of Candide, whose 
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philosophy that ‘everything is for the best in this best of all possible worlds’ leads to numerous 
just-so explanatory stories, such as ‘our noses were made to carry spectacles, so we have 
spectacles’. The Panglossian paradigm serves as a metaphor for some biologists’ adaptationist 
approach to evolution, where the presence of traits is explained through the useful function of 
those traits. The Panglossian Paradigm demands deterministic explanations, thereby precluding 
any possibility of trait origins being a product of non-adaptive factors such as drift. Gould and 
Lewontin (1979, p. 587) warned of the dangers of such explanatory approaches: ‘One must not 
confuse the fact that a structure is used in some way…with the primary evolutionary reason for 
its existence and conformation.’ Likewise, Lynch (2007) viewed selection-centered views as 
reducing evolution to a form of ‘engineering’, which he considered not only unnecessary, but 
also misleading. Other scientists, in contrast, have taken a holistic approach to evolutionary 
change that recognizes the relative contributions of both causal factors (e.g., Parker and Maynard 
Smith, 1990; Orr, 1998). In short, evolutionary biologists have debated how evolutionary change 
should be framed, with some taking an adaptationist approach, and others taking a more 
pluralistic approach to evolutionary causation.  
The competing roles of selection and drift in evolutionary causation have also been a 
subject of debate for philosophers of biology, but the importance of both concepts is not disputed 
(Sober, 1984). Discussions in the field of philosophy concern whether or not drift and selection 
are in fact two distinct concepts (e.g., Beatty, 1984; Sober, 1984; Matthen and Ariew, 2002; 
Millstein, 2002). Overall, in the philosophical and scientific communities, selection and drift are 
widely recognized by scientists and philosophers as two central evolutionary processes that 
should be considered when developing and testing explanations for trait differences between 
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units (e.g., genomes, populations, species, etc.). Thus, the primary debate concerns the relative 
contributions of selection and drift. 
Selection and drift in science education. Although stochastic processes are acknowledged 
as potential contributors to evolutionary change by biologists and philosophers (Gould, 2002; see 
above), life science curricula do not appear to reflect such scientific conceptualizations. For 
students to achieve expert-like competency in evolutionary reasoning, they must consider 
adaptive and non-adaptive processes as possible models of evolutionary causation. The National 
Association of Biology Teachers’ position statement on teaching evolution (2011) mentions 
genetic drift as an example the various mechanisms behind the diversification and extinction of 
living organisms. Yet, in the National Science Education Standards, while natural selection is 
highlighted, non-adaptive concepts such as genetic drift are not mentioned at all (NRC, 1996). 
Given this paucity of attention in national and state Standards, it is likely that non-adaptive 
reasoning is scarce in most K-12 life sciences curricula, although no empirical studies appear to 
have investigated this issue.  
Despite being of apparently peripheral focus in K-12 education, alternative mechanisms 
to natural selection are notably present in undergraduate and graduate biology programs and 
most college biology textbooks (e.g., Campbell, Reece, Urry, Cain, Wasserman, Minorsky and 
Jackson, 2008). Nevertheless, non-adaptive causal mechanisms are certainly not ubiquitous; 
indices of introductory biology textbooks indicate relatively low frequencies of topics related to 
‘genetic drift’ (Campbell et al., 2008: 3 pages/1267 content pages; Futuyma, 1998: 32 pages/754 
content pages; Freeman, 2005: 9 pages/1238 content pages). Furthermore, when present in 
textbooks, non-adaptive factors are usually insufficiently covered (Linhart, 1997). The same is 
true of laboratory manuals (Maret and Rissing, 1998). Considering the lack of emphasis on non-
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deterministic processes in the science standards (NRC, 1996) and the reliance on texts for 
teaching (Carpenter, Bullock and Potter, 2006; Cuseo, 2007), it is likely that most undergraduate 
science curricula over-emphasize natural selection at the expense of non-adaptive factors. It 
cannot be assumed that students receive appropriate instruction about non-adaptive causal 
mechanisms that would assist them in building pluralistic and expert-like conceptions of 
evolutionary causation. The possible consequences of a nearly exclusive focus on natural 
selection as the cause of evolutionary change are concerning and raise the question as to whether 
biology education is reifying an ‘adaptationist’ paradigm.  
Although a number of studies have developed activities for teaching genetic drift in the 
classroom, or advocated for hands-on activities relating to genetic drift (e.g. Nickels, Nelson and 
Beard, 1996; Maret and Rissing, 1998; Staub, 2002), remarkably little work has been done to 
explore how (or if) students think about non-adaptive factors in evolutionary change. We know 
that practicing evolutionary biologists attribute evolutionary change to selection, stochastic 
processes (e.g., genetic drift) or a combination of these two factors, but how are students’ models 
structured? This question motivated our explorations of biology students’ non-adaptive and 
adaptive evolutionary reasoning patterns. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
It is well established that students bring a variety of intuitive ideas to school that are in 
conflict with normative scientific perspectives (e.g. Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). 
Students deal with these contradictions in a variety of ways: they may ignore the new 
information and continue using their previous frameworks; they may maintain both the new and 
old information in parallel, accessing each in specific contexts or situations; or they may 
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construct a new conceptual framework that incorporates both the new and old knowledge 
(Fosnot, 1996). Students use their existing conceptual frameworks to process new experiences 
(e.g., assimilation) or, when the students’ current frameworks are inadequate in allowing them to 
make sense of new experiences, they must reorganize and/or replace them with new concepts 
(e.g., accommodation) (Demastes, Good & Peebles, 1995; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 
1982; Sinatra, Brem & Evans, 2008). Students are actively and constantly engaged in processing 
information and ironing out contradictions through the process of equilibration (Piaget, 1964). 
Students’ alternative conceptions in science, particularly those regarding natural 
selection, are well documented (e.g., Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Settlage, 1994; Demastes, 
Settlage & Good, 1995; Demastes, Good & Peebles, 1995; Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Nehm and 
Reilly, 2007; Nehm and Schonfeld, 2007; Nehm, Kim, and Sheppard, 2009; Gregory, 2009). 
These alternative conceptions are both abundant and persistent, and efforts to target them 
through instruction have yielded varied results (e.g. Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Demastes, 
Settlage & Good, 1995; Demastes, Good & Peebles, 1995, 1996; Dagher & BouJaoude, 1997; 
Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Nehm and Reilly, 2007; Sinatra, Brem and Evans, 2008). In an effort to 
understand how to improve student learning and thinking about evolution, most of the research 
in evolution education has focused on students’ alternative conceptions and how to change them 
(e.g., Demastes, Settlage & Good, 1995; Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 1995, 1996; Sinatra et al., 
2008). Much less research has focused on how students incorporate alternative scientific models 
of evolutionary causation; that is, work has yet to explore how non-adaptive factors should be 
situated theoretically, or how non-adaptive factors such as genetic drift are incorporated into 
students’ conceptual ecologies of evolution. 
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The development of evolutionary reasoning: theoretically situating non-adaptive 
causation. The National Research Council [NRC] (2001b) argues that an understanding of how 
students think and reason about domain-specific ideas should undergird the design of teaching, 
curriculum, and assessment. Such models should be based upon empirical evidence about how 
‘…students represent knowledge and develop competence in the domain’ (2001b, p. 3). Taken 
collectively, the aforementioned studies about student thinking and alternative concepts of 
evolution and natural selection contribute to the development of a model of how students think 
about and learn evolutionary concepts. Despite important early work in this area (cf. Catley, 
Lehrer, and Reiser, 2005), non-adaptive factors remain to be incorporated within cognitive 
models of evolutionary competence and corresponding learning progressions. 
Novice-expert studies, common in many areas of science education, provide crucial 
insights into notions of ‘competency’ as well as what is meant by normative and accurate 
scientific understanding (NRC, 2001b). When comparing novices with experts, research 
demonstrates that differences between novice students and expert scientists lie in a variety of 
factors, including metacognition, organization and categorization of knowledge, and 
presuppositions surrounding knowledge (e.g., Vosniadou, 1999; Chi, Feltovich and Glaser, 1981; 
Authors 2011). Novice-expert studies have also compared knowledge representation and which 
concepts are used to build explanations to account for scientific phenomena (Keil and Wilson, 
2000). Unfortunately, only one study has explored novice-expert reasoning patterns in evolution, 
with a focus almost exclusively on natural selection (Authors, 2011). 
While reasoning about evolutionary change is diverse and complex, expert-novice 
reasoning patterns, and associated benchmarks of competency, may be simplified and modeled 
based on existing research (see Table 2). In this framework, novices are defined as those who 
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tend to use exclusively naïve ideas, or both naïve ideas and key concepts of natural selection, in 
their explanations of evolutionary change (Authors, 2011). In contrast, ‘emerging experts’ are 
those whose explanations include key concepts of natural selection, but not naive ideas (Authors, 
2011). Though emerging experts provide accurate conceptions of selective causation, they may 
fail to incorporate possible non-adaptive factors, which are more common in experts’ models of 
evolutionary change (Authors, 2011). Experts may attribute change to either natural selection or 
genetic drift (e.g., Orr, 1998), or they may incorporate both selection and genetic drift (or other 
stochastic, non-deterministic processes) into their models of evolutionary causation (e.g., 
Ackermann and Cheverud, 2004). Considering that biologists employ either or both of these 
factors, it is reasonable to use these conceptual models as benchmarks for expert-like reasoning 
about evolution for life sciences students (Table 2, top row). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Nonetheless, students have difficulty understanding and reasoning about evolution, and 
their naive ideas are well documented in the literature (e.g., Gregory, 2009). Though traditional 
perspectives of conceptual change have approached naive ideas as extinguishable or replaceable 
(Posner et al., 1982), others have documented the persistence of naïve ideas, while new, accurate 
scientific concepts are added to naive ‘knowledge’ frameworks (Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi & 
Skopeliti, 2008; Kelemen and Rosset, 2009). Indeed, students may assimilate scientific concepts 
learned in school into their pre-existing knowledge frameworks, unaware of any conflict between 
the two, thereby creating mixed or synthetic mental models of the phenomenon (Vosniadou et 
al., 2008; Authors, 2011). Based on prior studies, it is likely that most high school and 
undergraduate students are concentrated at the bottom end of our expert-novice continuum for 
evolutionary reasoning (where reasoning about evolutionary change either involves only naïve 
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concepts and discarded historical ideas or comprises mixed models composed of both naive ideas 
and some accurate and/or discarded scientific concepts; see Table 2, bottom row).  
Not all students neatly fit into these categories, however. Previous studies have shown 
that some undergraduate students are able to successfully reason about natural selection using 
accurate knowledge elements (key concepts) without employing any naive ideas (Nehm and 
Schonfeld, 2008; Nehm and Ha, 2011). Though prior work has not investigated non-adaptive 
reasoning specifically in relation to the aforementioned expert-novice continuum, the students 
from these studies would be considered ‘emerging experts’ rather than ‘experts’, because despite 
their lack of naïve ideas, they do not include stochastic, non-deterministic processes as possible 
mechanisms of evolutionary change in their explanations. Furthermore, the participants in these 
studies were enrolled in introductory biology courses for majors and, presumably, had limited 
exposure to stochastic mechanisms of evolutionary change. Whether these students needed more 
exposure to instruction about non-adaptive reasoning before integrating it into their mental 
frameworks of evolution remains to be determined. In short, our evolutionary competency 
framework is used to situate students’ evolutionary reasoning sophistication. 
 
Research Questions 
In this study we explore if - and how - undergraduate students incorporate non-adaptive 
factors into their explanations of evolutionary causation. Specifically, we ask three questions: (1) 
Do students use non-adaptive factors to explain evolutionary change, and if so, does the 
frequency increase with increasing evolution coursework? (2) Is the use of non-adaptive 
reasoning patterns associated with greater knowledge of natural selection, or with fewer naive 
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ideas? (3) How do students structure explanatory models of evolutionary change when both 
adaptive and non-adaptive factors are included?  
 
Sample 
We gathered data from undergraduate biology majors at a large, public, Midwestern research 
university in the United States. Fifty-five students from two cohorts were studied. The first 
cohort was from early in a college biology program (second semester introductory biology) and 
the second was from late in the program (an advanced organismal biology class with a 
prerequisite of an upper-division evolution class). The first cohort was exposed to basic 
evolution content (including non-adaptive factors such as genetic drift), and evolution was also 
considered by the course instructor to be a ‘key theme’. The second cohort had extensive 
exposure to evolution (including selective and non-adaptive factors) in the introductory biology 
course, the advanced evolution course, and in the advanced organismal biology course. For 
brevity, we will refer to these two samples as ‘majors’ and ‘advanced majors’. The majors 
sample consisted of 28 students (43% male, 57% female) with an average age 20.4 years. The 
advanced majors comprised 27 students (56% male and 44% female) with an average age of 21.9 
years. The majority of students in both samples were White, non-Hispanic.  
 
Methods 
We used three methods to gather data on evolutionary reasoning patterns in the 
participants: (1) clinical oral interviews; (2) the open-response ACORNS assessment (Nehm, 
Beggrow, Opfer and Ha, 2012); and (3) the multiple-choice CINS test (Anderson, Fisher & 
Norman, 2002). Despite displaying psychometric problems (Battisti, Hanegan, Sudweeks & 
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Cates, 2010), the CINS is recognized as an instrument capable of generating valid inferences 
about general levels of students’ evolutionary knowledge. Each item of the CINS has one correct 
response option for each question; therefore, the total score of the CINS instrument ranged from 
0 to 20. While the original CINS paper suggests that it is a test only of natural selection 
knowledge, in fact it includes some questions about speciation, which is widely recognized as a 
macroevolutionary concept (Futuyma, 2008). For our sample of biology students, the reliability 
of CINS scores (measured with Cronbach’s alpha) was 0.7. 
The second instrument that we used was the newly developed open-response ACORNS 
(Assessing COntextual Reasoning about Natural Selection; Nehm et al., 2012). We used four 
isomorphic ACORNS items, standardized by familiarity: (1) How would biologists explain how 
a living mouse species without claws evolved from an ancestral mouse species that had claws? 
(2) How would biologists explain how a living lily species without petals evolved from an 
ancestral lily species that had petals? (3) How would biologists explain how a living snail species 
with teeth evolved from an ancestral snail species that lacked teeth? (4) How would biologists 
explain how a living grape species with tendrils evolved from an ancestral grape species that 
lacked tendrils? 
The ACORNS is a test of both microevolutionary and macroevolutionary knowledge 
because it prompts students to explain the causes (e.g., natural selection) responsible for 
between-species (i.e., macroevolutionary) change. To score students’ ACORNS responses, we 
utilized the published rubric of Nehm and colleagues (2010). This scoring rubric includes seven 
key conceptions and six naïve ideas. Key concept (KC) scores for each item ranged from 0 to 7, 
and naive idea scores for each item ranged from 0 to 6. The ACORNS responses were scored to 
consensus by two raters: a Ph.D. student in biology education and an evolutionary biologist. 
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ACORNS reliabilities (measured using Cronbach’s alpha) were 0.8 for KCs, 0.6 for naive ideas, 
and 0.8 for non-adaptive reasoning (for detailed example scoring, see below).  
The third approach that we used to explore students’ evolutionary reasoning was clinical 
oral interviews. All 55 students were recruited as volunteers by the interviewer by e-mail as well 
as at the beginning and end of various class periods and laboratory sessions, and these 
participants reflected the performance distribution in the overall sample. All participants were 
offered USD $20 for their participation. Approximately 16 hours of interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed. The majors sample comprised more than 10 hours of oral questioning 
(mean 19 minutes/student; range of 12-34 minutes). The advanced majors sample consisted of 
more than six hours of oral questioning (mean 15 minutes/student; range 8-24 minutes).  
The interview protocol was comprised of two ACORNS items (identical to those on the 
written instrument) and two novel isomorphic items with taxa and traits of comparable 
familiarity (see Nehm et al., 2012). The two novel isomorphic items were included in the 
interview to minimize a potential testing effect (i.e., higher scores because of prior attempts to 
solve the same problem). While answering, students were prompted by the interviewer to 
elaborate on what they had said or to clarify what they meant by the words that they used. 
Follow-up questions included prompts such as ‘Can you tell me more about X?’ ‘Can you 
explain what you mean when you use the word X?’ and ‘Can you tell me a little bit more about 
how X would happen, in general terms?’ Interviews were analyzed by two raters and scored 0 for 
the absence of non-adaptive reasoning, KCs, or naïve ideas, and 1 for the presence of non-
adaptive reasoning, KCs, or naïve ideas. An evolutionary biologist and a biology education Ph.D. 
student evaluated all oral interviews. Initial inter-rater reliabilities were 0.75 for oral interview 
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scoring, and all discrepancies were subsequently resolved by deliberation. Consensus scores 
were used in all subsequent analyses. 
We calculated descriptive statistics for the two samples (majors and advanced majors) 
and compared participant performance for all measured variables between the two groups using t 
tests. This information is useful for aligning our student sample with previously studied student 
samples in evolution education that used the same instruments (e.g., CINS). We also calculated 
Pearson correlation coefficients to examine putative interrelationships among measured variables 
from the multiple-choice CINS test, the open-response ACORNS test, and the clinical 
interviews. Variables included (1) the number of correct CINS scores; (2) the number of written 
key concepts of natural selection documented in the ACORNS; (3) the number of written naïve 
ideas identified in the ACORNS; (4) the number of written non-adaptive evolutionary factors in 
the ACORNS; (5) the number of mentions (or ‘naming’) of non-adaptive evolutionary factors in 
the clinical interviews; (6) the number of key concepts of natural selection in the interviews; and 
(7) the naïve ideas mentioned in the interviews. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated 
in PASW v. 18. 
 Finally, we used qualitative methods to examine the structure of students’ reasoning 
patterns. We examined transcripts of the interviews for (1) patterns of how students incorporated 
stochastic causal factors, such as genetic drift, into their explanations and (2) whether they 
conceptualized non-adaptive factors as alternatives to selection or as synergistic ‘forces’ of 
change. The purpose of including oral interviews was not only to validate inferences derived 
from students’ written answers, but also to create a holistic snapshot of students’ evolutionary 
reasoning patterns.  
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Results 
Associations among evolutionary reasoning elements. Pearson correlation analyses indicated 
that non-adaptive reasoning (NAR) interview scores were significantly correlated with NAR 
scores from the open-response ACORNS, but not with any scores from the multiple-choice CINS 
(Table 3). Specifically, both ‘mentioning’ and ‘scientifically explaining’ NAR scores from the 
interviews showed strong and significant associations with ACORNS NAR scores (r = 0.86, p < 
0.01 and r = 0.84, p < 0.01, respectively). Higher NAR ‘explaining’ scores were not significantly 
associated with greater key concept (KC) scores for the ACORNS (r = 0.04, n.s.) or with higher 
CINS scores (r = 0.08, n.s.). Thus, NAR appears to be a somewhat distinct reasoning pattern 
from selective reasoning. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Explanatory elements used by majors and advanced majors. We compared the types and 
frequencies of conceptual elements used in students’ explanations of evolutionary change 
(Figure 1). We found slight increases in students’ accurate knowledge elements (KCs, CINS 
scores) between the samples of majors and advanced majors (using both interview data and 
ACORNS data). However, these differences were not significant (CINS: t47= 1.33, p. > 0.05; 
ACORNS KC: t53= 0.63, p. > 0.05; Interviews KC: t53= 1.31, p. > 0.05). The types and 
frequencies of naïve ideas also did not differ appreciably between the two cohorts (ACORNS: 
t53= 0.88, p. > 0.05; Interviews: t53= 0.24, p. > 0.05). In contrast, NAR was much more frequent 
in the sample of advanced majors, as measured by both the clinical interviews and the open-
response ACORNS test (the CINS does not include NAR options) (Figure 1). However, NAR 
patterns were only significant for those students who ‘mentioned’ NAR in their interview 
responses (t28= 2.25, p. < 0.05, d = 0.61; Cohen, 1988). 
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Explanatory elements used in the ACORNS and clinical interviews. The KCs of 
variability, differential survival, and limited resources were the three most frequently used in the 
ACORNS responses and in the clinical interviews (Figure 2). However, the relative frequencies 
of these concepts differed for each assessment. In the interviews, variability was the most 
frequent, followed by limited resources and then differential survival. Overall, KCs were used 
more often in the interviews than in the written ACORNS instrument. In the written ACORNS 
assessment, differential survival was used most frequently, followed by variability and then 
limited resources. Relative proportions of the other four KCs were similar between written and 
oral responses, and in order of relative frequencies were hereditability, change in the frequency 
of a variant in a population, competition and hyper-fecundity. Hyper-fecundity was the least 
frequently applied KC; it was never used in the ACORNS and was only used once in the 
interviews. Overall, KCs were greater in number in the interviews than in the ACORNS, which 
is expected given the greater time allotted to oral questioning. Students spent almost twice as 
much time answering interview questions as they did answering ACORNS items (ACORNS: 
M=10.9, SD = 7.2 minutes; Interview: M=21.9, SD = 7.7 minutes (Figure 2). Overall, however, 
there was good correspondence between measures derived from the two methods. 
[Enter Figure 2 about here] 
Similar to the KC patterns that we documented, naive ideas were more abundant in 
interview responses than in the ACORNS responses (Figure 2). In both oral interviews and in 
written responses, however, naïve ideas were much more variable across items than KCs. The 
most frequent naïve idea used in both the interviews and in the ACORNS was needs/goals. The 
naive ideas use/disuse, energy, and pressure were about equally common in ACORNS 
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responses. Adapt was the least common naive idea found in the ACORNS responses. In the 
interviews, the second most common naive idea was pressure, while adapt and energy were 
equally the next most frequent. Use/disuse was the least common naive idea used during 
interviews. One notable pattern relating to NAR in both the ACORNS and interviews, was that it 
was used in the first item more often than in other items, and it was inconsistently applied across 
items (Figure 2, top row). In short, the interviews tended to elicit greater frequencies of ideas, but 
not different ideas, than those revealed in the ACORNS. NAR was rarely used regardless of the 
method of detection used, and naïve ideas were less common than KCs.  
Holistic reasoning patterns. Interview data revealed that all of the students who 
incorporated non-adaptive reasoning (NAR) into their explanations of evolutionary change (eight 
out of 55) presented NAR in the form of ‘genetic drift’, ‘bottleneck’, or ‘founder’s effect’ (See 
Table 4). Moreover, in all cases students represented NAR as an alternative to natural selection. 
This finding is in line with how many evolutionary biologists conceptualize the two concepts, 
where evolutionary change is attributed to either natural selection or genetic drift (e.g., Orr, 
1998).   
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 While at first glance the observation that students discussed genetic drift as an alternative 
to natural selection was indicative of expert-like thinking (see Introduction), follow-up questions 
during the interviews often revealed that many students poorly understood the concepts of 
genetic drift and/or natural selection. Indeed, only one student (Participant G from the advanced 
majors sample) accurately and consistently used both genetic drift and natural selection as 
possible mechanisms for evolutionary change across the four interview items (see below). 
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Participant G:  …another way would be more like genetic drift oriented, where, the 
presence or  
absence of a tail doesn’t matter very much. So, maybe it has no fitness 
ramifications in survivability and it just kinda [sic] fluctuates based on 
just randomness, you know, statistics, until eventually you’ve got all 
the opossums don’t have tails. That sort of random stuff does happen, 
sometimes, and it brings genes towards fixture that way. But, I would 
say, cause it, I would say most biologists would go with either natural 
selection or gene drift to explain the loss of tail over time in opossums. 
 
Interviewer:  So when you’re talking about the gene drift option, um, in that 
scenario, there would be no selection or there would be selection or… 
 
Participant G: There’d be no selection in like a more random gene drift. That would 
be, you know, in whatever scenario these opossums are living in the 
presence or absence of a tail has absolutely no impact on survivability, 
but the variation still exists. So, you know, due to, you know, maybe 
one opossum got lucky and found a lot of females in a small 
population or, you know, it just happened. Or maybe there was like, a 
tornado, that came and killed a bunch of opossums that had tails or any 
other number or random, uncontrollable events that don’t really have 
anything to do with the tail or lack of tail giving some sort of selective 
advantage. I mean, that’s how most, like, you’re flipping a coin just to 
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see which one comes out on top. Or lots and lots of coins. Thousands 
and thousands of times. 
 
Interviewer: So would you describe, um, the alternative, so we have the two 
options, the gene drift or the selection option, and gene drift you say is 
completely random, would selection be random or no? 
 




Participant G: Selection would be you’ve got some sort of reproductive advantage 
given by the lack of tail and that’s to the point where it’s, I mean, you 
could predict which opossums would do better and which opossums 
would do worse due to the presence or absence of the tail. So that’s 
like, there’s a, you know, like one thing I could think of would be 
opossums have a naked tail and in colder climates that could be a great 
way to lose heat, so maybe, you know, these opossums are living in a 
cold part of the world and all the opossums that have this large 
exposed naked tail lose a bunch of energy because they’re not 
insulated and the opossums that don’t have a tail save that energy and 
put it into reproduction or offspring or whatever and they end up 
coming out with better results. So that’s less ran-, that’s not random, 
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that’s, you know, it’s predictable, and there’s, like, the natural 
selection, you know, force, that’s kinda [sic] acting on it. Where 
there’s like a quantifiable difference in the fitness, and like the vitality 
and viability of the gene. 
 
A second student from the advanced majors sample presented ‘genetic drift’ as one possible 
solution for the fourth interview item about cactus spines (see Methods). 
 
Participant E: I guess that could be similar with either, like a genetic mutation or 
maybe a genetic drift and, uh, just, could also have to do with, uh, like 
being an anti-predatory defense to, uh, protect it since it’s in a harsh 
environment already, they kinda [sic] have to guard themselves from 
anything that’s going to get water out of them. 
 
Interviewer:  You said that it could be a genetic mutation or genetic drift, can you 
explain what you mean by genetic drift? 
 
Participant E: I always forget the definition of genetic drift. Um, it’s kinda [sic]  just 
like, uh, a swing towards one extreme instead of where it was before, 
but I guess, so I guess that kind of takes away from what I was going 
towards, I guess, kinda [sic] contradicted myself. 
 
Interviewer: What’s swinging? What is that is swinging towards one extreme? 
 
Participant E: Uh, just kinda [sic] like, the genetic makeup or the, uh, actual 
structures that are present are kinda [sic] more of a shift from one to 
another based on the pressures that they’re getting from the 
environment or from, from other species around them. 
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Interviewer: When you say structures, do you mean, um, what do you mean by 
that? 
 
Participant E: Um, sorta [sic] like the actual spines, in this case, or uh, the the [sic] 
cells within, that are used to maintain the water and the moisture and 
hold it. 
 
Interviewer: And how, how does that process of swinging towards one of the 
extremes or another come about? 
 
Participant E: Um, I guess that would be more, type of a, kind of, more of natural 
selection, where they’re, where if they don’t change then they’re just 
going to die out, so without, if the, if they didn’t develop the spines, 
there’d be no way for them to completely protect themselves, they 
would, without spines they’d probably evolved in another way and 
came up with some sort of poison or something else that would have 
deterred predators and stuff from eating them. 
 
While participant E mentions the term ‘genetic drift’, his explanation for this term was 
scientifically inaccurate (the student confuses genetic drift with directional selection, and he was 
therefore given a scientific NAR score of ‘0’).  His answer demonstrates that a student’s use of a 
scientific term is not always indicative of scientific understanding of a concept (cf. Rector, Nehm 
and Ha, 2011). This situation also occurred with students’ use of the terms ‘bottleneck’ and 
‘founder effect’. When prompted to explain the meanings of these terms the students were 
unable to provide an accurate or clear definition (see below).  
 
Interviewer: …how would biologists explain how a living opossum species without a 
tail evolved from an ancestral opossum species that had a tail? 
	   23	  
 
Participant A: Um, hold on, well it could also, it could be the bottleneck effect or the 
founder’s effect, like, the ancestor species could have had like a nat-, 
disaster, like a, calamity, so only a few of the, uh, individuals survived and 
those individuals like maybe had like a dwarf gene, or like a, like a gimp 
tail I guess. And then eventually it started being more prevalent in the, in 
the new species that started from there. Or, just, um, reproductive 
success… 
 
Interviewer:  …And you talked about how, uh, back with this bottleneck effect or this 
founder effect… 
 
Participant A:  Mm hm. 
 
Interviewer: That there were individual, a few individuals that had a, a dwarf tail or, 
um, gimp tail… 
 
Participant A: …Yeah. 
 
Interviewer: Um, how did that, how did they have that tail, or how did they get that 
different tail? 
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Participant A: Um, maybe like survivors from the calamity had like some, uh, maybe 
they did, maybe they didn’t, like they could have expressed that gene in 
like, uh, um, uh, in like a repressed way, than having like a full on gene or 
maybe they had the full gene and then, like, eventually, wait can you 
repeat your question? Sorry. 
 
(General confusion ensues and then Participant A provides an adaptive explanation) 
 
Overall, clinical interviews corroborated our statistical findings that knowledge of NAR 
is not associated with greater understanding of natural selection, or with fewer evolutionary 
naive ideas. Similarly, in clinical interviews and in ACORNS responses, most students 
inconsistently applied NAR, or lacked what has been termed ‘knowledge coherence’ 
(Kampourakis & Zogza, 2009). 
Evolutionary Reasoning Competencies in the two cohorts. We found that on the spectrum 
of novice to expert reasoning about evolutionary change, the majority of our students (both 
majors and advanced majors) fell into the novice category (Table 2, Figure 3). Recall that the 
novice category was characterized by naïve or naïve + scientific reasoning. Based upon the 
written explanations, only one student from the majors sample held a purely naïve model, while 
no students from the advanced majors cohort held such models. In the interviews, none of the 
students from either cohort were found to exhibit purely naïve models. Most students exhibited 
mixed models comprised of both naïve ideas and KCs (Figure 3). Written responses indicated 
that 16 majors and 14 advanced majors held mixed models, whereas interview responses 
indicated that both cohorts had 19 students exhibiting mixed models. Interestingly, a small 
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number of students from each cohort displayed mixed models while also incorporating non-
adaptive reasoning into their explanations (ACORNS: two from the majors sample, two from the 
advanced majors sample; Interviews: one from the majors sample, four from the advanced 
majors) (Figure 3). There were a number of students categorized as emerging experts based on 
their written explanations (eight majors, ten advanced majors). During the interviews, in contrast, 
seven majors exhibited purely adaptive models, although only two advanced majors used KCs 
exclusively (Figure 3). Nevertheless, a small number of advanced majors fell into the expert 
category (that is, students explaining evolutionary change using both adaptive and stochastic 
conceptual models; ACORNS: two students; Interviews: three students). No students from the 
majors sample reached the expert level.  
[Enter Figure 3 about here] 
It was challenging to unambiguously situate a few students along our novice-expert 
continuum. For instance, one student from the advanced majors sample displayed a complex 
mixed model (naive ideas + KC + NAR) in the interview (Participant F), but not in the written 
assessment. Based on her ACORNS responses, we placed Participant F in the adaptive vs. 
stochastic model of reasoning even though she had provided explanations using NAR 
exclusively. She was placed in this category because she had used key concepts (variability and 
change of population) in her explanations of genetic drift. However, her response demonstrated 
that some key concepts were not specific to natural selection; in fact, KCs such as variability and 
change of population are necessary for explaining evolutionary change by stochastic processes as 
well as deterministic processes. Accordingly, this student was labeled as having an expert-like 
model of evolutionary reasoning. However, placing students along a continuum of evolutionary 
reasoning competency was straightforward in most cases. Classifying our two student samples 
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revealed that, regardless of the assessment method or amount of biology coursework completed, 
most students failed to reach expert-like levels of reasoning about evolutionary change. 
 
Discussion 
While science education research has produced a large body of work investigating the 
learning, teaching and assessment of natural selection (e.g., Bishop and Anderson, 1990; 
Demastes et al., 2001; Settlage, 1994; Nehm and Ha 2011; Nehm and Schonfeld, 2008), 
strikingly few studies have focused on students’ thinking about non-adaptive evolutionary 
factors such as genetic drift, despite its important role in experts’ empirical tests and theoretical 
models of evolutionary change (e.g., Ackermann and Cheverud, 2004; Lande, 1976; Orr, 1998; 
Parker and Maynard Smith, 1990). This gap in the literature motivated our exploration of non-
adaptive reasoning patterns (NAR) in undergraduate students, and whether such patterns differed 
between cohorts of introductory and advanced biology students exposed to varying degrees of 
non-adaptive content. We used three different methodologies to explore students’ NAR: the 
multiple-choice CINS, which ignores NAR but measures understanding of natural selection and 
speciation; the ACORNS, a constructed-response format test that captures students’ evolutionary 
explanations across contextual features; and extended clinical oral interviews. We used these 
three different methods to rigorously and holistically determine how, and to what degree, 
students used stochastic and non-deterministic factors to explain evolutionary change, and how 
their explanatory models were constructed.  
Students’ use of NAR. Given Gould and Lewontin’s (1979) widely-cited criticisms about 
biologists’ over-reliance on exclusively adaptive factors to explain evolutionary change, and 
contemporary biologists’ use of hypothesis tests that explore the relative contributions of non-
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adaptive mechanisms such as genetic drift in evolutionary change, the goal for biology students 
should be to understand and apply the mechanisms that the field of evolutionary biology 
currently uses to account for organismal diversity through time and space (Gould, 2002). In 
short, students’ competency in evolutionary reasoning should be measured by their ability to 
consider both drift and selection as possible causal mechanisms in their explanations for trait 
change. What our study reveals is that the vast majority of students in our sample have not 
reached this competency benchmark.  
Student use of non-adaptive reasoning is not associated with greater knowledge of natural 
selection or with fewer naive ideas about evolution. Most students in the majors and advanced 
major samples used mixed models of evolutionary reasoning, implying that despite increased 
instruction in evolution, most students failed to reach expert-like conceptualizations of 
evolutionary change. Instead, their responses suggest that they simply added new concepts (e.g. 
genetic drift or differential survival) into their existing naïve explanatory frameworks and 
regardless of the amount of biology coursework completed, expressed both KCs and naive ideas 
at comparatively the same frequency when cued to reason about evolutionary change (Figure 3). 
Nevertheless, advanced majors’ relatively greater use of NAR suggests that increased exposure 
to instruction about stochastic processes, such as genetic drift, is in fact associated with increases 
in students’ use of NAR in their evolutionary explanations, (albeit not at desired magnitudes; see 
Figure 1).  
The structure of students’ explanatory models of evolutionary change. When students did 
use NAR in their explanatory models of evolution, they either used it within a mixed model of 
reasoning, or they used it as a competing mechanism of evolutionary change (i.e., in an expert-
like model of adaptive vs. stochastic reasoning; Figure 3). Additionally, most students did not 
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consistently apply NAR across items (Figure 2), suggesting that the association of this concept 
within students’ evolutionary reasoning framework is not theory-like (Vosniadou et al., 2008) or 
was selectively cued across items differing in surface features (Nehm et al., 2012; Nehm and Ha, 
2011). Indeed, only two of the three students from the advanced majors cohort who did use 
NAR, did so consistently and expressed an adaptive vs. stochastic model of reasoning about 
evolutionary change. This corroborates previous work suggesting that expert-like evolutionary 
reasoning models include more stable associations of concepts within conceptual reasoning 
frameworks (Nehm and Ha, 2011).  
Those students who reached an expert-like model of evolutionary causation adopted 
models of stochastic vs. adaptive change, but none of them expressed integrative causal models 
(i.e., the top level of Table 2). For example, Participant G (see excerpt above) was a student from 
the advanced majors cohort who included both natural selection and NAR across all four items in 
both the ACORNS written assessment and in the interview. Participant G employed what we 
term an expert-like model of reasoning, although one that frames adaptive causation as 
competing with stochastic causation of evolutionary change. Another student, Participant F, 
provided only NAR in the ACORNS explanations, yet also discussed NAR and selection as 
possible alternative causal mechanisms of evolutionary change in the interviews. It is interesting 
that the written format of the ACORNS elicited NAR only, while the interviews elicited both 
possible mechanisms. However, this seems to be an anomaly and not significant enough to 
warrant any adjustments to our framework of novice-expert reasoning about evolutionary change 
(Figure 2). Regardless of assessment format, this student reached expert levels of reasoning. 
 Implications for teaching and learning. Our study demonstrates that current approaches 
to teaching genetic drift and other non-deterministic processes may not be effective at helping 
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the majority of students attain expert-like models of evolutionary causation. Students’ models of 
evolutionary change in our sample were overwhelmingly composed of a combination of naive 
ideas and key concepts of natural selection (Figure 2). Not only is this the case for majors in 
introductory courses; it is also true of advanced majors who have successfully completed an 
entire course in evolutionary biology. Clearly, exposure to genetic drift does not appear to be 
sufficient for inducing students to accommodate NAR into their mental models of evolutionary 
change and build expert-like explanatory models (i.e., Table 2, top row). This finding suggests 
that teachers should move beyond definitions or simulations of genetic drift (e.g., Staub, 2002) 
and illustrate to students how genetic drift is conceptually structured within models of 
evolutionary causation. Teachers could present cases of how evolutionary biologists currently 
use both genetic drift and natural selection to test alternative hypotheses and build explanatory 
models of evolutionary change. Such examples may facilitate more advanced perspectives on 
stochastic and adaptive causal factors in evolutionary biology (e.g. Orr, 1998; Ackermann and 
Cheverud, 2004).  
Our findings also suggest that NAR and scientifically accurate selective reasoning are 
distinct patterns of thinking about evolution. This raises the question of whether the lack of an 
association among NAR, KCs, and naïve ideas is a product of the way these evolutionary 
concepts are taught, or if it is an intrinsic way of thinking about evolution. For instance, perhaps 
students fail to use NAR in their evolutionary explanations because they view the lack of 
emphasis on drift in the classroom as indicative of its relatively low level of importance in 
evolutionary change. On the other hand, students may fail to use NAR in their evolutionary 
explanations because the concept is more difficult to accommodate into existing cognitive 
frameworks compared to selective reasoning concepts. Regardless, based on students’ response 
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patterns, it appears that they have not sufficiently accommodated NAR into their evolutionary 
reasoning frameworks, even after advanced instruction in evolution. Rather, interviews and 
open-response assessments clearly indicate that most students at introductory and advanced 
levels of instruction assimilate NAR concepts with KCs and naive ideas of selective reasoning 
into unstable (i.e., non-coherent), naïve models of evolutionary causation (cf. Kampourakis & 
Zogza, 2009; Nehm and Ha, 2011). It is important to note, however, that student response 
patterns may not always mirror cognitive processes, and our interpretations are constrained by 
the methods we used to uncover student thinking and the sample that we studied.  
The finding that no students used selective + stochastic causation models in their 
explanations of evolutionary change raises the question of whether this, too, is a product of 
teaching experiences or a default approach to thinking about evolution. Stochastic factors such as 
genetic drift often receive minor instructional focus and are presented as an alternative model to 
natural selection (e.g., Linhart, 1997). It is possible that standard approaches prevent students 
from conceptualizing cases in which stochastic processes work in tandem with selective 
processes to generate patterns of genotypic and phenotypic change. Such integrated causal 
models (selective + stochastic) are perhaps more complex, and thereby may be beyond the grasp 
of students still struggling to restructure common naive ideas. Indeed, it may require more 
comprehensive evolution instruction using extensive theoretical and experimental examples. 
However, it is important to note that some evolution experts continue to use an adaptive vs. 
stochastic model of evolutionary change in their research programs (e.g. Orr, 1998), and so it is 
possible that a selective + stochastic model is simply a less common, alternative framework for 
experts within evolutionary biology. Further work is needed to explore this issue. 
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Overall, our study highlights the fact that NAR receives very little attention in the science 
education or evolution education literature. Future research exploring novice and expert 
understanding and application of NAR would help to reveal what a more expert-like model of 
evolutionary reasoning would look like and could inform the design of evolution learning 
progressions (cf. Catley et al. 2005). 
Implications for assessment. Assessments are central to helping teachers foster 
meaningful science learning (NRC, 2001b). However, it is imperative that those assessments 
meet quality control criteria established by the educational measurement community (AERA, 
2004). Measurement instruments, among other things, must comprehensively assess all facets of 
a well-defined construct (Neumann, Neumann, and Nehm, 2011). In the domain of evolutionary 
biology, natural selection and genetic drift are the two most important causal factors that 
biologists use to explain evolutionary change (Orr, 1998). Thus, to measure evolutionary 
thinking, instruments must provide the opportunity for students to explain change using natural 
selection, genetic drift, or combinations of drift + selection. Currently, there are no such 
instruments. 
One important consideration for helping teachers to understand students’ thinking about 
evolution is to employ instruments that are capable of capturing progress in students’ conceptual 
growth. As we argue, measuring progress in evolutionary reasoning requires the consideration of 
both stochastic and deterministic factors in evolutionary causation, in addition to common naive 
ideas about evolutionary change (Table 2). Many widely used instruments, nevertheless, ignore 
the possibility that non-adaptive factors (such as genetic drift) could contribute to patterns of 
evolutionary change that the instrument scenarios present (e.g., Bird beak evolution in Anderson 
et al.’s CINS instrument). Thus, teachers across the educational hierarchy must develop and 
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deploy instruments that include the measurement of NAR in formative and summative 
assessments of evolutionary thinking.  
Multiple-choice assessments are often a popular choice among instructors considering the 
time and expertise needed to develop and grade open-ended items. However, multiple-choice 
items rarely provide mixed model options (that is, not just right or wrong options), despite the 
fact that such reasoning models may be very common in samples (as we found in our study). If 
we want our assessments to fulfill their purposes, we must consider the large proportion of 
students who have mixed models for explaining evolutionary change and revise our multiple 
choice assessments to reflect this well established finding. No multiple-choice instruments to our 
knowledge allow for the measurement of mixed models. 
Study limitations and implications for future work on non-adaptive reasoning. Although 
we were able to describe how students reason about evolutionary change and their use of NAR, 
we were not able to determine why students did not incorporate NAR into their models of 
evolutionary causation. Because all students in our sample were assigned readings that covered 
genetic drift, and had the opportunity to listen to lectures that included the topic of genetic drift, 
the lack of NAR in student explanations could be due to poor teaching of the topic. Indeed, 
although the curriculum included material on genetic drift, we do not know how drift was taught 
to students. Additionally, it is unclear whether teachers incorporated developmental constraints, 
or other lesser-known non-adaptive factors (see Gould, 2002), into their teaching, or whether the 
curricula included them at all. It is possible that other student cohorts exposed to instruction on 
drift in a more integrated and sophisticated manner would show different patterns than those 
observed in our sample. Thus, our findings may not generalize to other student samples. Future 
studies should explore the relationship between instruction and NAR to determine whether 
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specifically addressing NAR (beyond genetic drift) through instruction, or how teaching NAR in 
different ways, influences students’ use of NAR in their evolutionary explanations.  
We have described how evolutionary biologists employ (1) selective factors, (2) 
stochastic factors, or (3) a combination of both factors to explain evolutionary causation 
(Futuyma, 2009). We consider biologists’ explanations as reasonable expert-level targets for 
students in life sciences courses. However, it is important to note that philosophers of science 
may not agree with how evolutionary biologists’ perceive and study selective and stochastic 
mechanisms of evolution. Though evolutionary biologists appear to consider natural selection 
and genetic drift to be distinct concepts and attribute evolutionary change to either one (e.g. Orr, 
1998) or both (e.g., Ackermann and Cheverud, 2004), philosophers of science are not in 
agreement as to whether in fact drift and selection are distinct concepts or not (e.g., Beatty, 1984; 
Sober, 1984; Matthen and Ariew, 2002; Millstein, 2002). This issue clearly requires further 
attention. Interviews with evolutionary biologists that explore their perceptions of selective and 
non-adaptive causal mechanisms could provide insights into experts’ perspectives regarding 
evolutionary causation. Additionally, both evolutionary biologists and philosophers of biology 
would benefit from an open dialogue about the causal factors of evolutionary change; such a 
conversation would be fruitful, not just for the progression of their respective fields, but also for 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Definitions of natural selection and genetic drift from glossaries of introductory college 
biology textbooks. 
Word Definition Textbook 
Natural 
Selection 
A process in which organisms with certain 
inherited characteristics are more likely to survive 
and reproduce than are organisms with other 
characteristics. 
Campbell, N.A., Reece, J.B., 
Urry, L.A., Cain, M.L., 
Wasserman, S.A., Minorsky 
P.V., and R.B. Jackson. (2008). 
Biology. 8th ed. New York: 




The process by which individuals with certain 
heritable traits tend to produce more surviving 
offspring than do individuals without those traits, 
resulting in a change in the genetic makeup of the 
population. A major mechanism of evolution. 
Freeman, S. (2005) Biological  
Science. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle  






The differential survival and/or reproduction of 
classes of entities that differ in one or more 
characteristics; the difference in survival and/or 
reproduction is not due to chance, and it must 
have the potential consequence of altering the 
proportions of the different entities to constitute 
 
Futuyma, D.J. (1998). 
Evolutionary Biology. 3rd ed. 
Sunderland: Sinauer 
Associates, Inc. 
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natural selection. Thus natural selection is also 
definable as a partly or wholly deterministic 
difference in the contribution of different classes 
of entities to subsequent generations. Usually the 
differences are inherited. The entities may be 
alleles, genotypes or subsets of genotypes, 





A process in which chance events cause 
unpredictable fluctuations in allele frequencies 
from one generation to the next. Effects of genetic 
drift are most pronounced small populations. 
 
Campbell et al. (2008). 
Biology. 8th ed. New York:  





Any change in allele frequencies due to random 
events. Causes allele frequencies to drift up and 
down randomly over time, and eventually can lead 
to the fixation or loss of alleles. 
Non-adaptive change (e.g., genetic drift) occurs 
when the frequency of a trait increases or 
decreases because of stochastic factors, 
regardless of whether the trait confers an 
advantage, disadvantage, or is neutral with 
respect to survival or reproduction (Freeman, 
 
Freeman, S. (2005) Biological  
Science. 2nd  ed. Upper Saddle 
River: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
 





Random changes in the frequencies of two or 
more alleles or genotypes within a population 
Futuyma, D.J. (1998). 
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Table 2. A theoretical framework for novice-expert evolutionary reasoning about natural 









Both natural selection 




‘…although the initial divergence of 
Homo from the australopiths may 
have involved selection, divergence 
after this time (at least in the facial 
characters analyzed) could have 
occurred through random processes 
alone.’ 
 
‘This result suggests that both 
random and to a lesser extent 
nonrandom processes played an 
important role in the diversification 
of this morphologically diverse 
group; it does not necessarily mean 
that both played a role across all 




















selection or genetic 








‘QTL data do provide information on 
the roles of natural selection vs. 
genetic drift in phenotypic 
evolution.’ 











































Only natural selection 
‘A mutation may have taken place 
that allowed a locust to be immune 
to DDT, this trait was then passed 
on. These immune locust were the 
 
(Nehm and Ha, 
2011) 
See also this 







only (ones) that survived and 
reproduced.  Over time, the mutated 













ideas and key 
concepts)  
 





‘Flightless bird species could have 
originated from other bird species 
that can fly because they did not 
have a specific need for flight. Since 
they didn't need and/or use their 
wings for flight, a selective pressure 
may have worked on them to cause 
their wings to become flightless.’ 
(Nehm and Ha, 
2011) 
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Table 3. Correlations among scores derived from the CINS, ACORNS, and clinical interviews. N 
= 55. (** p <0.01, * p < 0.05). NAR= Non-adaptive reasoning; KC = Key Concepts; NI = Naive 
Ideas. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) CINS 1.000        
(2) ACORNS KC 0.426** 1.000       
(3) Interview KC 0.401** 0.566** 1.000      
(4) ACORNS MIS -0.355** -0.377** 
-
0.521** 1.000     
(5) Interview MIS -0.158 -0.213 -0.354** 0.550** 1.000    
(6) ACORNS 
NAR 0.017 -0.038 0.046 -0.169 
-
0.043 1.000   
(7) Mentioning 
NAR 0.002 -0.089 0.046 -0.158 
-
0.121 0.861** 1.000  
(8) Scientific 
NAR 0.079 0.039 0.060 -0.157 
-
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(-1, 0 or 
+1) 
A  Bottleneck, 
founder’s 
effect 
‘…it could be the bottleneck effect or the 
founder’s effect, like the ancestor species 
could have had like a nat-, disaster, like a, 
calamity, so only a few of the, uh, 
individuals survived and those individuals 
like maybe had like a dwarf gene, or like 
a, like a gimp tail I guess. And then 
eventually it started being more prevalent 
in the, in the new species that started from 
there.’ 
0.5 0 
B  Bottleneck ‘…Or, um, if there were opossums with 
shorter tails and something happened to 
like bottleneck them or something, and it 
didn’t have, uh, an advantage or 
disadvantage they could just go away 
randomly.’ 
0.5 1 
C  Founder’s 
effect 
(defining the word) ‘Um, it’s like when, 
uh, part of the population gets isolated 
and, uh, um, it’s like alleles get uh, a rare 
allele becomes dominant.’ 
0 1 
D  Founder 
effect, 
bottleneck 
‘…um, I guess that would be a founder 
effect I think, or a bottleneck. Um, so the 
species without petals not necessarily that 
it was favored but because it was in 
greater variety or greater, uh, it was in 
greater number than the ones without, that 
had the larger petals, it eventually, uh, I 
guess it was eventually derived to a 





‘I always forget the definition of genetic 
drift. Um, it’s kinda just like, uh, a swing 
towards one extreme instead of where it 
was before, but I guess, so I guess that 
0 1 
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kind of takes away from what I was going 






‘I guess with genetic drift what would 
happen is, um, like a random grouping of 
like, let’s say out of a hundred only four 
of these just happen to have, like, this 
mutation…so over time, like, their genes 
were the ones that were being passed 
down randomly, um, into the population, 
and it just happened to be that as time 
went on, it was their genes that caused the 
population, like, not really caused the 
population but, um,  is what the 
population formed into.’ 
0 1 
G Gene drift, 
genetic drift  
‘you’ve got your random genetic drift 
option where there was variation in the 
presence or absence of teeth in the first 
species, and then randomly, you know, 
maybe due to natural disasters, or just 
certain members got lucky in breeding, 
you’d have the fixture of the lack, or the 




‘I think the way genetic drift influence it, 
is that through time and passing on of 
traits and genes, that it was affected, oh 
gosh, I feel like I’m rambling and I’m not 
really saying anything. (long pause) I 
can’t really think of what I want to say 
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Figure 1. A = ACORNS and I = Interview. (A) Average scores of both majors and advanced 
majors for the CINS, (B) key concepts in the written ACORNS assessment and Interviews (C) 
naive ideas used in the ACORNS and interviews, and D) Non-adaptive ideas used in the 
ACORNS and interviews. Though advanced majors show a slight increase in key concepts used 
and a slight decrease in naive ideas used, this trend is non-significant. However, advanced 
majors do use significantly more non-adaptive ideas in their evolutionary explanations 
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Figure 2. Diversity and abundance of explanatory elements used in the ACORNS and the 
clinical interviews. Both key concepts and naive ideas were more abundant in interviews 
than in the ACORNS. Stochastic reasoning was used more often in the first item than 
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Figure 3.  114 = majors and 625 = advanced majors. Percentage of students who fall into each 
category of expertise. The majority of students used a mixed model, though a small portion of 
these also included NAR into their explanations (shaded gray). A large portion of students also 
held pure adaptive models and would therefore be considered emerging experts. Only advanced 
majors reached expert-like levels of reasoning and these students used adaptive vs. stochastic 
models. No students held selective+stochastic models of evolutionary reasoning. 
 
 
 
 
 
